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Do Farmers Exhibit Disposition Effect?: Evidence from Grain Marketing 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Grain marketing studies have traditionally relied on standard economic theory in which 
producers make decisions that are logical and out of self-interest. However, Brorsen and 
Anderson (2001) discuss implications of behavioural finance for agricultural marketing and 
indicate psychological biases which can affect marketing decisions. Empirical studies find 
evidence that producers exhibit loss aversion and probability weighting, and tend to sometimes 
overestimate price and underestimate risk (Eales et al., 1990; Collins et al., 1991; Humphrey and 
Verschoor, 2004; Cruz Junior, 2008; Lui, 2008; and Riley and Anderson, 2009). Empirical 
studies show that individual producer’s behavior does not necessarily follow the standard 
rationality assumption, but rather exhibit features of prospect theory (such as loss aversion and 
probability weighting) and other theories. 
Studies in behavioral finance have identified several types of behavior often found among 
investors. One of the most common types of behavior is the disposition effect, which reflects the 
notion that investors tend to hold losing positions too long and close winning positions too fast 
(Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998; Frino et al. 2004; Locke and Mann, 2005; Brown et al., 
2006; Dhar and Zhu, 2006). Weber and Camerer (1998) explain that the disposition effect can be 
explained by two dimensions of prospect theory. One is the idea that individuals make decisions 
based on a reference points, with outcomes above this reference point being valued as gains and 
outcomes below it valued as losses. The second dimension is related to loss aversion, indicating 
that individuals would be willing to take more risk when faced with losses and take less risk 
when faced with gains. 
The objective of this research is to explore the existence of disposition effect among 
farmers in Canada. More specifically, it investigates whether Canadian wheat farmers exhibit 
disposition effect when marketing their grain. This study tries to identify whether farmers wait 
too long to price their grain or whether they price their grain too soon, which in both cases imply 
that they miss opportunities to obtain higher prices. A unique data set was made available by the 
Canadian Wheat Board for the crop years 2003/04 through 2008/09 for all producers growing 
Canada Western Red Spring (CWRS) wheat. The data contains information on (i) type of 
contract used to market wheat, (ii) tonnes delivered, (iii) date when producer priced the grain, (iv) 
final price received by each producer, (v) seeded acres, and (vi) province. Another data set was 
also obtained with additional information encompassing annual cost of production for each 
province and harvest pace showing how much of the crop was harvested on a weekly basis in 
each province. 
The grain marketing system in Canada offers a unique opportunity to explore how 
producers make decisions. All wheat produced in Western Canada and sold for human 
consumption and export must be marketed through the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), which is 
the largest grain marketing agency in Canada and offers several pricing alternatives providing 
distinct combinations of return, risk and cash flow. These pricing options include different 
contracts which have distinct features but essentially allow producers to use futures markets to 
price their wheat. Since all producers have to market their grain through the CWB, it is possible 
to follow exactly when they chose to market their grain, what market conditions were prevalent   3
during the period they made their decisions, and what price they received at the end of the crop 
year. 
This study uses a unique data set of all wheat producers in Canada to perform a 
comprehensive analysis of the disposition effect in grain marketing. It is investigated whether or 
not this type of behavior is prevalent among farmers and what characteristics help explain it. 
Exploring this phenomenon is relevant as it sheds more light on the decision making process in 
grain marketing. As indicated by Hagedorn et al. (2005), despite the importance of marketing in 
farm management it is alarming to realize that prevalent ideas about marketing decisions and 
performance still do not rely on a large body of evidence. This study aims to fill in these gaps and 
move us towards a more complete understanding of grain marketing. 
 
BACKGROUND 
The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is the largest grain marketing agency in Canada and 
the sole marketer for wheat, durum wheat, and barley produced in Western Canada. All wheat 
producers must market their crop through the CWB, which includes producers from Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, Alberta, and the Peace River area of British Columbia, who are selling wheat for 
human consumption and export. The CWB offers several different marketing alternatives which 
allow producers to choose a program that meets their own needs and preferences regarding return, 
risk, and cash flow. The oldest pricing alternative is pool pricing, which is the default program, 
meaning the CWB assumes producers will keep their wheat in the pool accounts unless otherwise 
indicated. 
The pool accounts work by pooling together all the wheat sales made during the crop year 
and its goal is to guarantee that all producers receive the same final price regardless of when and 
to whom their grains are sold. With the pool accounts, producers receive an initial payment when 
deliveries are made to the grain handling facility, and additional payments as sales are completed 
throughout the crop year. During the crop year, the CWB also provides a projected price, the Pool 
Return Outlook (PRO) that is the best estimate of what the final pool price will be at the end of 
the crop year. The PRO is often seen as the benchmark price and can be used to alert famers as to 
whether to keep their wheat in the pool accounts or to sign one of the other marketing alternatives 
offered by the CWB, collectively known as Producer Payment Options (PPO) contracts. 
PPO contracts have only been developed by the CWB in the last 10 years. They allow 
producers to price their own grain and provide them flexibility to manage their cash flow. With 
PPO contracts, producers can lock in their price or basis using futures contracts through the CWB. 
For all PPO contracts there is a marketing window during which producers need to let the CWB 
know about their marketing choices. Producers can also decide to use more than one alternative, 
in which case they need to tell the CWB what proportion of their grain will be marketed by each 
instrument. PPO contracts also differ from pool accounts in terms of payment schedule. Once 
producers make their initial delivery to the grain handling facility and receive that same initial 
payment as the pool accounts, they receive their final payment within 10 business days upon 
confirmation of delivery.
1 
                                                 
1 Producers using the pool pricing and PPO contracts receive the same initial payment upon delivery to the grain 
handling facility because the federal government guarantees the payment.   4
This study focuses on pricing programs for wheat, including five contracts: Early 
Payment Option (EPO), Fixed Price Contracts (FPC), Basis Price Contract (BPC), Daily Price 
Contract (DPC), and FlexPRO. All of them were essentially developed to allow producers more 
flexibility to price their own grain and try to obtain higher prices. The only exception is the EPO, 
which was developed to provide better cash flow management for producers. PPO contracts and 
pool accounts can be used simultaneously, but producers must let the CWB know how many 




The disposition effect has been largely investigated in the context of financial markets. 
Shefrin and Statman (1985) have first identified this kind of behavior. They highlight the 
aversion to loss realization as the theoretical background to explain why investors tend to sell 
winning positions too early and hold losing positions too long. They claim that loss aversion (as 
discussed in prospect theory) would make investors reluctant to realize losing positions, but also 
discuss other motivations such as mental accounting, regret aversion, and self-control. 
Several other studies use market data to explore the existence of the disposition effect 
among different players in financial markets. Odean (1998) uses data provided by a discount 
brokerage house on 10,000 securities accounts traded between 1987 and 1993. Jordan and Diltz 
(2004) examine a group of accounts provided by a securities firm specializing in day trading 
between 1998 and 1999. Frino et al. (2004) use data on 8,762 trading accounts from the four 
main futures contracts traded at the Sydney Futures Exchange in 1999. Locke and Mann (2005) 
focus on 334 futures traders in currencies and commodities markets at the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange in 1995. Dhar and Zhu (2006) use trading records of more than 50,000 individual 
investors from a discount brokerage firm between 1991 and 1996. Brown et al. (2006) use data 
on investors in 450 IPO stocks and 380 Australian Stock Exchange index stocks between 1995 
and 2000. Choe and Eom (2009) follow all individual transactions of 69,391 different traders in 
the Korean stock index futures market between 2003 and 2005. All these studies find evidence 
that investors and professional traders tend to liquidate winning positions too early and ride 
losing positions too long. 
There are also other interesting dimensions to be explored in the context of the disposition 
effect. Dhar and Zhu (2006) try to answer the question of why the disposition effect might vary 
across individuals. Some of their findings indicate that the disposition effect might be related to 
certain demographic characteristics. For example, investors with low income and nonprofessional 
occupations tend to exhibit the highest values for disposition effect in their sample. Another 
dimension that has been explored is whether the disposition effect leads to lower returns. 
Evidence appears to be mixed in this matter. Odean (1998) finds costs associated with the 
disposition effect. On the other hand, Locke and Mann (2005) find no evidence that traders 
selling winning positions too early and holding losing positions too long would make less profit 
than their peers who exhibit less or no disposition effect. They argue that this finding suggests the 
disposition effect does not necessarily imply inferior trade quality, but rather a benign trading 
style that generates patterns consistent with the disposition effect. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
The method adopted to examine the existence of disposition effect in grain marketing 
follows Choe and Eom (2009) and is similar to Odean (1998), Frino et al. (2004), Brown et al. 
(2006), and Dhar and Zhu (2006). This method looks at the frequency with which winning and 
losing positions are closed relative to the opportunities to close them. Four variables are defined 
for each farmer during a crop year: realized gain, paper gain, realized loss, and paper loss. From 
these variables two ratios are calculated for each farmer: proportion of gain realized (PGR) and 
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is the number of days in crop year t that farmer i had a chance to price his grain at a loss but did 
not execute it. 
The disposition effect (DE) for farmer i in crop year t is given by the difference between 
PGR and PLR, as shown in equation 3. A positive (negative) DE indicates the farmer is more 
(less) likely to realize a gain than a loss, i.e. the farmer tends to price his grain faster when he is 
gaining than when he is losing. 
t i t i t i PLR PGR DE , , ,           ( 3 )  
Studies in equity markets typically use the purchasing price of the equity as a reference 
price to calculate realized and paper gains and losses. In the context of grain marketing the 
reference price is not as clear. In the current study realized and paper gains and losses are 
measured against two benchmarks: the pool price in the previous crop year, and the Pool Return 
Outlook (PRO) price in the current crop year. The pool price in the previous year represents the 
price farmers would have gotten if they had marketed their whole crop using CWB’s pool 
accounts (and hence using no marketing contracts that allow them to price grain outside the pool 
accounts). It is a static benchmark and assumes that in the current year farmers would try to price 
their grain above the price obtained by the pool accounts in the previous year. The PRO price is 
the forecast of the pool price for the current year and is used as a dynamic benchmark in the sense 
that it is updated regularly during the crop year. The assumption behind this benchmark is that 
farmers would try to price their grain at a higher price compared to what the CWB expects to 
obtain for the pool accounts. 
Starting at the beginning of each crop year, paper gains and losses are calculated by 
comparing the current price offered by a marketing contract on a daily basis with the reference 
price. Realized gains and losses are calculated by comparing the actual price obtained by a farmer 
on the day that he signed a marketing contract with the reference price. These calculations   6
provide values for PGR and PLR for each farmer in each crop year, and therefore for the 
disposition effect (DE). 
 
DATA 
Data for this research was provided by the CWB and includes producers growing Canada 
Western Red Spring (CWRS) wheat in the crop years 2003/04 through 2008/09 in Western 
Canada (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia). The data set contains 
information on all producers who grew CWRS wheat in at least one of the six crop years 
provided and marketed their wheat in pool accounts, new marketing contracts (PPOs), or both. 
Even though PPOs were first available in 2000/01, the data set starts in 2003/04 because the 
initial three crop years had minimal PPO usage. 
Data contains transactions made by each producer that indicates (i) what marketing 
contract they used, (ii) how many tonnes of wheat were delivered to each contract, (iii) exact 
dates when producers signed up their marketing contracts, (iv) final price received by each 
producer for their wheat, (v) Pool Return Outlook (PRO) and futures prices, (vi) seeded acres, 
and (vii) province/municipality. The marketing contracts include pool accounts and five types of 
PPO contract (Fixed Price Contracts, Basis Payment Contracts, Early Payment Option, Daily 




The first part of this research project focuses only on one type of marketing contract, the 
Fixed Price Contracts (FPCs). Therefore the analysis uses a data set with 12,520 wheat producers 
who used either FPCs or pool accounts in all crop years between 2003/04 and 2008/09. So no 
producer in this sample has used any of the other new marketing contracts available to them 
(DPCs, BPCs, or EPOs). Discussion will also be concentrated on the disposition effect measured 
using the current PRO price as the reference price. Results with the previous pool price as the 
reference price are qualitatively similar, but have the drawback of not allowing to calculate 
disposition effect in three years because prices were always above or below the reference price 
(which made it impossible to calculate either PGR or PLR). 
Table 1 presents calculated values for the disposition effect (DE) for each crop year 
between 2003/04 and 2008/09. Results show the mean values of DE are always positive and 
statistically distinguishable from zero based on a t test. Summary statistics also indicate that the 
distribution of DE is mostly asymmetric towards positive values and leptokurtic. In addition, 
almost all farmers exhibit positive DE (except for the crop year 2005/06). Histograms of the 
distribution of DE in Figure 1 provide an illustration of the findings based on the summary 




                                                 
2 Some programs were available since the beginning of the data set, while others were created later. For a complete 
description of the different types of PPO contracts please see the Canadian Wheat Board website at www.cwb.ca.   7
Table 1: DE using current PRO price as reference price – Descriptive Statistics 
  2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Mean  0.0124 0.0182 0.0127 0.0134 0.0083 0.0268 
t statistic 
a 9.94 75.25 8.73 90.25  50.45  40.11 
        
Std.  dev.  0.0100 0.0113 0.0327 0.0107 0.0142 0.0232 
Skewness  1.1396 2.1303 1.3800 1.6849 -0.3613 1.2426 
Kurtosis  9.6511  10.8023  1.2008 9.6796 3.6186 6.9439 
        
Highest  0.0568 0.1194 0.1765 0.1111 0.1016 0.1920 
Lowest  -0.0222 -0.0090 -0.0191 -0.0340 -0.0964 -0.0278 
        



























(a) Null hypothesis: mean is equal to zero; (b) Positive indicates the number of farmers with DE 
above zero, negative indicates the number of farmers with DE below zero, and the numbers in 
parentheses show the percentage of farmers with DE positive or negative. 
 
These findings suggest that farmers tend to price their grain faster when the current price 
offered by the FPC is above their reference price (which is assumed to be the current PRO price), 
and take longer when the price offered by the FPC is below their reference price. In other words, 
they tend to make pricing decisions faster when they see an opportunity to price their grain above 
their reference price, but wait longer to sign the marketing contract when they are faced with the 
possibility of pricing their grain below the reference price. 
This result is consistent with several studies in financial markets which find that 
professional traders and investors tend to realize gains faster than they realize losses. However, 
there can be different motivations to either realize gains or losses or wait for further opportunities. 
Aversion to loss realization is a possible motivation to realize gains faster than losses, but there 
can be rational considerations as well. Odean (1998) argues that portfolio rebalancing, tax 
considerations, and favorable informational are some reasons that could potentially explain the 
asymmetric realization of gains and losses. Similarly, Frino et al. (2004) argue that investors 
might realize gains quickly or hold on to their losses because of information advantages. If 
investors with losing positions have a high subjective probability of favorable price changes, they 
might wait longer to liquidate their positions so that they have a chance to turn their positions 
into winners. Dorn and Strobl (2009) also highlight the importance of information asymmetry to 
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In the context of this study, farmers might decide to price their grain faster when they 
have the chance to sell at a price above their reference price because they believe prices will drop 
and future opportunities to price their grain will happen at lower prices. Alternatively, they might 
wait longer to sell their grain if the price is below their reference price if they believe price will 
increase and hence give them have better opportunities to price their grain in the future. An initial 
step to explore this issue is to look at the relationship between the calculated DE for each farmer 
and the price each farmer obtained by selling wheat using FPCs. In each crop year farmers are 
ranked according to the prices they received by selling grain using FPC
3. Then average DE 
values are calculated for the top 10% and bottom 10% farmers of these rankings. If there are 
rational motivations behind the disposition effect, averaged DEs should be higher for the top 10% 
and lower for the bottom 10% farmers. In other words, if farmers who obtain higher prices tend 
to price faster when there is a gain opportunity and take longer to make a sell when faced with a 
loss, this can be an indication that they have informational advantage. 
Table 2 shows the average DE for the two groups of farmers in each crop year. The t test 
allows to reject the null hypothesis that the means are the same in both groups (except for the 
crop year 2003/04), suggesting there are differences in DE among farmers who obtain higher 
prices and those who obtain lower prices. In four out of five crop years in which the difference 
between DEs is statistically distinguishable from zero, the top 10% farmers exhibit higher DE 
than the bottom 10% farmers. This result indicates that farmers who sell faster when faced with a 
gain opportunity (or those who wait longer when faced with a loss opportunity) tend to obtain 
higher prices compared to those who take longer to sell when faced with a gain opportunity (or 
those who sell faster when faced with a loss opportunity). Scatter plots of prices and DE for each 
farmer in each crop year provide a broader picture of this finding, suggesting there might be some 
positive relationship between higher prices and marketing strategies consistent with the 
disposition effect (Figure 2). 
 
Table 2: Average DE for farmers who obtain higher prices and farmers who obtain lower prices 
  Average DE for top 
10% farmers 
Average DE for 
bottom 10% farmers 
Obs. t  statistic 
2003/04 0.0114  0.0133  6  0.1924 
2004/05 0.0157  0.0089  220  -7.0752 
2005/06 0.0645  0.0118  50  -8.2982 
2006/07 0.0097  0.0073  517  -4.9228 
2007/08 0.0083  0.0108  736  8.8389 





                                                 
3 If a farmer used an FPC more than once during the crop year, the final price received is a weighted average of all 
prices obtained each time an FPC was signed (the weights are the quantity of grain sold each time).   10
Figure 2: Scatter plots of DE and price received by farmer in each crop year (current PRO price 

























































































































































This is a work in progress and the current paper reports preliminary findings regarding the 
disposition effect in grain marketing. Examination of pricing strategies of 12,520 wheat farmers 
who used Fixed Price Contracts (FPC) between 2003/04 and 2008/09 shows evidence of 
disposition effect in their marketing decisions. They seem to make marketing decisions faster 
when the price offered by FPCs is above the reference price, and to take longer to make decisions 
when the price offered by the FPCs is below the reference price. On average, calculated values 
for the disposition effect are positive in all crop years, suggesting farmers sell wheat too early 
(late) when price is above (below) the reference price. However, there appears to be no cost 
associated with this behavior. Preliminary analysis also shows that farmers with larger positive 
values for the disposition effect tend to obtain higher prices than their peers with lower values for 
the disposition effect. This finding would indicate that farmers who quickly sell wheat at a gain 
but wait longer to sell if faced with possible losses might be actually following a rational strategy 
rather than behaving irrationally (in the traditional notion of disposition effect). 
Further points remain to be explored in this research project. Tests of disposition effect 
are a joint examination of the hypothesis that people sell winning positions more quickly than 
they sell losing positions and of the specification of the reference price used to determine gains 
and losses (Odean, 1998). The current paper reports preliminary results using two reference 
prices (previous pool price and current PRO price), but there are other potential reference prices 
available to farmers in Western Canada. Three of them could be cost of production, historical 
futures prices, and final price received by each farmer in the previous crop year, which will also 
be adopted as reference prices as this project progresses. 
Another dimension is the inclusion of other marketing contracts. The present paper only 
considers one of the new marketing contracts developed by the CWB, namely the Fixed Price 
Contract (FPC). This is helpful in the first stage of the research project as it allows focusing on 
farmers who chose to use a single marketing contract. The scope of the analysis can be expanded 
by considering farmers who use other marketing contracts and also different combinations of 
marketing contracts. 
It is also interesting to explore in more detail whether the presence of disposition effect 
actually makes producers miss better opportunities to price their grain and therefore obtain higher 
prices. Preliminary analysis presented here suggest farmers who price their grain at a gain faster 
than they do at a loss obtain higher prices, but more work is needed in order gather more 
convincing evidence either supporting or contradicting this initial finding. 
Finally, once the existence of disposition effect is identified, a regression analysis can be 
performed to better understand the impact of market and individual characteristics on this type of 
behavior. The variable DE would be the dependent variable in the regression model, and 
explanatory variables can include harvest pace, type of marketing contract used to price the grain, 
seeded acres, and years of experience in farming. 
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